HUDUD - The chicken and duck talk

THE Chinese proverb "a chicken talking to a duck" would best describe the protracted debate between Pas and DAP on the implementation of hudud.

Of course, the barrier is not that either party did not understand the language of the other, as the proverb dictates. It is rather the "political language" used, whereby intentions and expressions do not run parallel.

If attention were to be given to the details, the confusion appears to be intended.

From the word go, when Pas' venerated Datuk Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat decided to revive the dormant hudud issue on Sept 17, it was obvious the debates and opinions expressed would end up in a babel.

Nik Aziz, then reacting to reports of high incidences of HIV/AIDS in Kelantan, said the problem would have been curtailed had the state been allowed to implement hudud.

He then blamed former prime minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad as the stumbling block to its implementation.

What commenced is classic political grandstanding, spewing of rhetoric and irrelevance, so much so that the basic issue plaguing hudud has been totally ignored.

The issue of hudud today cannot be addressed in the context of when it was introduced in Kelantan in the 1990s, when Pas took the helm in the state.

Then, at best, Pas and its partners in the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah -- comprising Pas, the now-defunct Parti Melayu Semangat 46, Hamim and Berjasa -- were only focusing on winning the Malay-majority states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis.

At the same time, Semangat 46 led by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, was straddling another opposition grouping -- the Gagasan Rakyat (comprising Semangat 46, DAP, Parti Bersatu Sabah, Indian Progressive Front, Parti Rakyat Malaysia and some smaller entities).

The reason for the two opposition groupings then was obvious -- Tengku Razaleigh could not bring DAP and Pas together. Much of it was because of ideological polarity, the former for its ideological commitment to secularism, and the latter for its commitment to theocracy.

All this was created in the run-up to the 1990 general election -- and there was much talk the opposition would succeed, through the two fronts, and deny Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority.

The results proved otherwise, though Pas managed to take over Kelantan and made many inroads into Kedah and Terengganu.

The results also burst the bubble of the opposition and its supporters, and by 1995, DAP pulled out of Gagasan Rakyat, describing its position in the grouping as untenable due to its association with Semangat 46, which, in turn, was associated with Pas which was then actively promoting hudud and a theocratic state.

Such is the allergy of DAP towards Pas, that even indirect association via Semangat 46 was not an option.

That was in 1995.

Then in 1999, DAP seemed to have overcome its allergy to Pas and joined the Barisan Alternatif (comprising Parti Keadilan Nasional, DAP, Pas and Parti Rakyat Malaysia.

Again, the opposition failed to deny BN the two-thirds majority, but Pas was again the biggest gainer by further securing Kelantan, winning Terengganu and making major inroads into Kedah.

In 2001, obviously realising that it was losing its electorates, DAP decided to pull out of Barisan Alternatif, citing irreconcilable differences with Pas over the Islamic state issue.

While all past developments vis-a-vis Pas and DAP relations had always proven that the two would team up for the general election only to fall out post-polls once the results were not in their favour, the 2008 general election conjured a different equation.

For the first time, under Pakatan Rakyat, the opposition denied BN its two-thirds majority, DAP got to rule Penang and went on to become the power behind the "throne" in Perak and Selangor.

Pas, apart from retaining Kelantan, took over Kedah and got to be the "titular" head in Perak.

In other words, finally, the cooperation between DAP and Pas paid off for both parties, though the former was the bigger gainer.

The 2008 election success had given opposition supporters and leaders the belief that they might just be able to pull the carpet from under BN's feet in the next general election.

With that, the past equation when Pas wanted to implement hudud changed.

Previously, Pas was able to blame Umno and BN for blocking its theocratic ambitions.

But now, as Pas and its partners rally their supporters to believe that they will take over the nation's rule, it cannot use such reasons to justify its inability to implement hudud.

Based on the premise that the opposition will win in the next general election, if Pas is serious in wanting to implement hudud, it must convince its partners to include the law in its manifesto, regardless whether it is to be confined within the Malay states or nationwide.

If it can't, then Pas must be honest enough to admit that it is not going to be able to implement hudud because its partners oppose the implementation.

This is based on the opposition's projection, post-election; Umno and BN are irrelevant in the equation as they would be the opposition.

Maybe Pas is still blaming Umno and BN because it knows the opposition won't be able to take over Putrajaya.

The babel is then understandable.

p/s This article first appeared in The Sunday Times - 16th Oct, 2012